On November 27, the Red Building of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv hosted a roundtable discussion on “Christian morality and traditionalism among Ukrainians and Russians – what exactly is the difference between the two peoples?” The event was organized by the Conservative Platform (a project of the NGO “Foundation for Promoting Democracy“) with the support of the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Ukraine.

The discussion was not only about cultural or religious differences. The event brought together leading Ukrainian scholars, religious scholars and public figures to discuss the role of conservatism in the politics of Russia and Ukraine. Special attention was paid to how Russia uses “traditional values” as a tool of hybrid warfare.

Moderator: Yaroslava Bozhko, Head of the Center for Political Studies “Doktryna“. He noted that Russia has long turned the rhetoric of “traditional values” into a political tool – a way to legitimize the war, control its own population, and influence Western audiences. According to him, this is a “screen” that hides a pragmatic and authoritarian policy that has nothing to do with the declared moral principles.

This rhetoric is nothing more than a convenient mask to justify aggression and repression, which have nothing to do with Christian ethics.

“In fact, Russia is actively exploiting right-wing conservative and Christian traditionalist rhetoric, passing it off as a certain ideological screen. However, this ideology is nothing more than a cover, as their cynical and pragmatic policies do not correspond to the declared conservative values in the slightest” – Bozhko.

Victor Yelensky: How religion works in diplomacy and why “Holy Rus” is a myth

Religious scholar, Doctor of Philosophy and head of the State Service for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience Viktor Yelenskyy spoke about how Ukrainian religious communities are involved in international support for Ukraine. In particular, during 2023-2024, evangelical Protestants – Baptists and Pentecostals – repeatedly traveled to the United States, participated in forums on religious freedom, and met with congressmen. According to him, these trips really helped to change the tone of the conversation about Ukraine among American conservatives and influenced decisions on aid.

“Our Ukrainian Protestants – Baptists and Pentecostals – have made a series of regular visits to the United States to convince the American community and conservative circles that Ukraine is “Europe’s biblical belt”. We had to demonstrate to the world that active religious communities not only existed, but also stood in the breach for the country during the war, confirming their deep patriotic commitment.”

At the same time, he added, Russia is conducting an active information campaign to present Ukraine as a country that “persecutes Christians.” It is promoted by American lawyer Robert Amsterdam, a man who works in the interests of Novinsky. In an interview on Tucker Carlson’s show, he accuses the Ukrainian authorities of “religious pressure.”

Yelenskyy explained that the new Ukrainian law does not force churches to change their calendar, language, or autocephalous status. It only requires a clear position: to recognize that the church is no longer subordinate to Moscow and to certify its withdrawal from the Russian Orthodox Church, especially in the context of the occupied territories.

He also drew attention to the Ukrainian example of religious equality. In the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches, the voice of the smallest Lutheran community weighs as much as that of the largest Orthodox community. And in Ukrainian politics, representatives of different denominations coexist peacefully: “We had an Orthodox president, a Jewish prime minister, a Greek Catholic speaker of parliament, and a Baptist secretary of the National Security and Defense Council.”

Speaking about Russian ideological myths, Yelensky recalled the real numbers:

“When we talk to a Western audience, it is most productive to turn to world rankings to show what this ‘Holy Rus’ really is. And it will turn out that it leads Europe in terms of social catastrophe: the number of premeditated murders per 100,000 people. Moreover, Russia is a champion in drunken suicides and one of the world’s winners in the number of abandoned children. These shocking facts completely destroy the image of a “bastion of conservatism” created by Moscow.

In terms of religiosity, there are no illusions either: Russia is consistently among the least involved countries in Europe, along with East Germany and Estonia. All this, according to Yelensky, is important to convey to Western audiences through facts, not slogans.

Serhiy Kvit: Russia is not conservatism, but a myth covering imperialism

Serhiy Kvit, President of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, called for careful use of terms such as “conservatism” or “nationalism” when referring to Russia. In his opinion, these concepts have a deep cultural context and cannot be applied to Russian political reality without distorting the meaning.

“To avoid falling into such self-deception, we need to understand that conservatism in the British or American sense has absolutely nothing to do with how Russia is trying to position itself. We need to see that Russia is essentially imperialism and chauvinismand their talk of traditional values is just a mythologythat glues them together and does not reflect a real political culture”

He explained that the Russian Federation is simultaneously trying to be attractive to both the left and the right: on the one hand, as a critic of capitalism and Western liberalism, and on the other, as an alleged defender of traditional values. In fact, according to Kvit, this is a typical imperial project that should be called by its proper names: chauvinism, imperialism, fascism (in the sense of nationalism of a state that seeks to dominate others).

He also pointed out that there is no structured political culture in Russia – only a “scorched field” without connections between people, where everything is based on fear, control and pressure. What unites this space, according to Kvit, is mythology.

“However, despite their internal disintegration and chauvinism, they have something that unites them. This is the key thing – mythology, namely the Myth of the Holy Russia“, so-called, and so on. In order to find political formulations to describe their culture, we need to look at their myths in essence, because that is the only thing that holds them together.” He summarized.

Yuriy Pidlisnyi: Traditionality is not about words, but about numbers

Yuriy Pidlisnyi, PhD, lecturer at the Ukrainian Catholic University, called for not exaggerating the traditional nature of Ukrainian society based on rhetoric or self-image alone.

“When 80% of the population calls themselves believers, but the divorce rate is 58%, something doesn’t add up,” he said.

In his opinion, conservatism in Ukraine is not a reality, but rather a task that has yet to be accomplished. Public opinion may be pious, churches may be active, but indicators of family life, birth rates, and the duration of marriages show otherwise.

Mr. Pidlisny also pointed out that many Western (especially right-wing) conservatives, particularly in France, perceive Russia as the “last bastion of tradition.” This myth, he said, is deeply rooted, and that is why it needs to be refuted not just with words, but with facts.

“When we look at the statistics in Russia to refute their myths about conservatism, we see that the situation with divorce rates, abortions, domestic violence is significantly higher than in Ukraine. How can they talk about fighting against ” by the demonized West“, when “we will see more satanism in Russia“? A country that has significantly greater problems with these moral indicators cannot justify its war by claiming that it is going to save the world from sin.”

The rhetoric about “Holy Russia” fighting the “satanism of the West” sounds nice, but it has no moral basis, Pidlisnyi believes. If we are talking about real values, we need to see how they are embodied in life, not on flags.

Alexander Saltovsky: Kyiv is not a branch of Moscow, but an alternative to the “Third Rome”

Doctor of Political Science and professor at the Kyiv National University Oleksandr Saltovsky made a historical excursion to show that the connection between Ukrainian Orthodoxy and Moscow is not a tradition, but rather a political obsession.

He recalled that for centuries the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had opposed the union with the Moscow state, and the struggle for autonomy continued until the eighteenth century. That is why, according to Saltovsky, the claim of a “common spiritual identity” is more of an imperial myth than a historical fact.

He also criticized the idea of a “symphony” between church and state in Russia, which is supposedly organic to Orthodoxy. In Moscow’s version, Saltovsky says, it has always been a one-sided game: the state controlled the church, used it, and often brutally suppressed it.

“Ukrainian Orthodoxy has always treated Moscow with great caution because of this problem of symphony. In the Moscow kingdom, the state did not know true partnership with the church; it was ready to destroy it institutionally. As Kostomarov noted, if the church tried to oppose the state, “it dealt it fatal blows.” Therefore, it can be stated that “In Moscow, the state not only coexisted with the church, it actually dealt it fatal blows,” which led to the church being headed by a secular prosecutor, not a spiritual leader.” He noted.

In contrast, Saltovsky proposed to turn to the Ukrainian spiritual tradition centered in Kyiv, which has long maintained autonomy, openness to the West, and internal pluralism. He recalled the concept of “Kyiv as the Second Jerusalem,” which has deep roots in the Orthodox world and can serve as an alternative to the myth of Moscow as the “Third Rome.”

“It’s high time we abandoned the role of reacting and constantly denying Russian myths and narratives. Our strategy should be proactive: we have our own, no less profound spiritual and cultural tradition. Instead of denying it, we should offer this tradition to the world as a positive response and show that it is a solid foundation of our identity and European future.” – Saltovsky.

Vladislav Gavrilov: ROC is not just an observer, but a participant in crimes

Historian Vladyslav Havrylov drew attention to the direct involvement of the Russian Orthodox Church in crimes against Ukrainian civilians. Contrary to the widespread perception of the church as a bystander to the war, he said, the ROC plays an active role in systemic aggression.

He gave examples: The ROC is involved in the mass deportations of Ukrainian children, acts as a tool to legitimize this process, and supports Russia’s policy of cleansing the religious field in the occupied territories.

“We need to convey to the West a clear understanding that the ROC is not just a spiritual structure. It is a key element of the Russian regime, which directly performs the function of ideological support for crimes. It is responsible for supporting the aggression, justifying the war, and its actions, such as mass deportations of Ukrainian children and establishing a monopoly in the occupied territories, confirm that it is an ideological continuation of the criminal regime,” Gavrilov said.

It is not just about cooperation, but about establishing a monopoly. Only the Russian Orthodox Church is allowed to operate in the Russian-controlled regions, while others are banned, often accused of “terrorism” or “extremism.” According to Gavrilov, this rhetoric is very similar to the Bolshevik model of fighting “counterrevolution.”

This example, in his opinion, illustrates well that “traditionalism” in the Russian context is a tool of control, not a value.

Andriy Rudyk: Russian “Christianity” in Africa is a cover for crimes

Political scientist and military officer Andriy Rudyk described how Russia uses religion as a tool of influence on the Global South, particularly in Africa. According to him, the rhetoric of “traditional values” is no less active there than in Europe, and often has non-spiritual consequences.

He cited the example of the Central African Republic, where Russia supports a local Baptist leader using religious channels as part of a geopolitical game. At the same time, according to Rudyk, the Russian presence in the region is primarily mercenaries and private military companies that have nothing to do with Christian values.

“When we talk about the crimes committed by Russian mercenaries in Africa, for example, in Mali, we see that Russian ‘Christians’ are the ones who behead, rape and cut out organs. They kill both Muslims and Christians indiscriminately. How can they speak of themselves as defenders of Christianity when their actions are criminal, including organizing organ transplants? This information must be brought to the world, because it is not broadcast to Europe or the African continent.”

Rudyk emphasized that this information practically does not reach the media, while Russia continues to promote itself as a “civilizational alternative” even where its influence is accompanied by war crimes.

In his opinion, Ukraine should not just deny Russian narratives, but show the facts, especially in communication with the countries of the Global South, and do so loudly, systematically, and proactively.

Olena Semenyaka: To resist Russia, we must study it

Olena Semenyaka, a philosopher, youth studies scholar, andIntermariumAmbassador, emphasized that in order to win the war against Russia, one must have a deep understanding of its ideology. And it’s not just about modern propaganda, but about the entire cultural and philosophical heritage that has shaped Russia’s view of itself and the world.

She mentioned the legacy of Slavophiles, Westerners, and Eurasians, as well as the influential ideas of figures such as Fyodor Dostoevsky. Despite his popularity, Dostoyevsky himself admitted in his Writer’s Diaries that Russian messianism often turns into nihilism, i.e., the rejection of everything alien and “other” under the guise of spiritual superiority.

Semenyaka also mentioned Spengler‘s philosophical concept of “pseudomorphosis,” when a national culture takes on foreign forms without truly assimilating them. According to her, the contemporary Russian thinker Alexander Dugin himself describes Russian identity as “archaomodern ” – a strange combination of archaic, aggression, and modern technology.

“It is chaos made of wreckage, and it is this chaos that is fighting against Ukraine today. And not only with tanks, but also with meanings,” she emphasized.

Semenyaka called for not just refuting Russian ideas, but offering her own, deep counterpoint, capable of speaking to the West on equal terms-not just in terms of anti-liberalism or resistance.

“We cannot remain in a position where we are only reacting and constantly denying Russian myths and narratives. We need to go beyond just being ‘against something’. Instead, we need to become proactive and “be the bearers of a constructive alternative” that should manifest itself on the intellectual, cultural and political levels. This means that Ukraine should actively offer the world its own, deep worldview concept, which includes the “planetary dimension” and “spiritual cultural categories”

Ruslan Khalikov: Russian ideology is a hybrid product for export

Ruslan Khalikov, a religious scholar, military officer, and publisher, continued his criticism of Russian conservatism as a propaganda export that has no real basis in Russian society itself. According to him, Russian ideology is not a system of values, but a flexible set of stories for different audiences.

“I would like to support the idea that Russian ideology is exportable. It does not derive from the values prevalent in Russian society, because it is not obliged to do so. Ideology is always an instrumental thing, and it is designed for export. Moscow offers completely different stories to different recipients: “For American Protestants, they offer that they are conservatives. For African post-colonial states, for example, they suggest that they are decolonizers.” This shows that the Russian authorities are acting pragmatically, using ideology as a weapon to influence the West and the South.”

Khalikov suggested exploiting contradictions within the Russian ideological scene itself, including conflicts between “guardians” (orthodox stateists) and traditionalists who rely on more mystical ideas like Ganon. These differences, he believes, can be effectively highlighted in counterpropaganda to show the insincerity and fragmentation of Russian messages.

At the same time, he criticized the excessive fascination with figures such as divorce rates, which are sometimes presented as evidence of the decline of tradition. Khalikov reminded that millions of Ukrainians are now abroad, and a significant number of men are at the front, so these figures cannot fully reflect the state of society.

“Yes, the statistics have increased, but the reason is not a change in values, but the war. Ukrainian society remains quite conservative – it’s just not always visible on the surface,” he said.

Yuri Kiselyov: Russia is a pseudo-morphosis that has stolen its name, language and faith

Doctor of Geography and Professor Yuri Kiselev presented his analysis of Russia as an example of civilizational pseudomorphism, i.e. a culture that adopts foreign forms without assimilating them in essence. He identified three dimensions of this distortion.

The first is historical. According to Kiselyov, Peter the Great deliberately stole the name “Rus” when he began calling his state the “All-Russian Empire.” It was the theft of a Greco-Latin name that historically belonged to Kievan Rus. Thus, the new empire gained external legitimacy that did not correspond to its ethno-cultural core.

The second is linguistic. Russians are ethnogenetically of Finno-Ugric and Turkic-Mongolian origin, but at the same time they adopted Old Bulgarian (Church Slavonic) as the basis of their “national” language and culture. This created a linguistic artificiality that looked Slavic but did not correspond to the actual cultural origin.

The third is religious. Kiselyov emphasized that what is called Orthodoxy in Russia has nothing to do with the Christian essence, as the ROC blesses weapons, violence and war by supporting aggression against Ukraine.

“What is called Orthodoxy in Russia, and religion in general, is not really that. The Christianity that blesses missiles and prisons is not Christianity, but only a political system with a religious wrapper. We see them blessing the instruments of mass murder of civilians in Ukraine, which is not at all in line with the essence of the Christian religion. This is devilish Orthodoxy in quotation marks, with which neither dialog, nor understanding, nor compromise is possible,” he said.

According to Kiselyov, pseudo-morphosis is the key to understanding the Russian model of the state, which seems to resemble European or Orthodox states but functions on completely different principles.

Mikhail Boychenko: Russian “conservatism” is a simulacrum and a weapon

Philosopher and professor of the Kyiv National University Mykhailo Boychenko called Russian conservatism a simulacrum, that is, an imitation that has no real content. According to him, Russia is substituting concepts: it presents realpolitik – the game of interests and power – as a moral doctrine, although it is simply political cynicism wrapped in “traditional values.”

He also touched on the religious dimension, tracing how Orthodoxy was artificially imposed in northern Russia during the Horde as a religion convenient for control. In this context, he spoke of “negative cultural selection” -when the most cruel, cynical, and convenient for the system remained in power for centuries. This, in his opinion, formed a specific Russian political psyche, different from the Western or Ukrainian ones.

“Russia did not just break away from the Orthodox world, it ‘hacked’ it,” Boychenko said.

According to him, this is not Christianity, but an instrument of intimidation and control that only outwardly resembles religion. That is why, he believes, any attempts to negotiate, seek compromise, or engage in dialogue are an illusion, because we are not dealing with an ideology, but with an anti-value system where even faith is used as a means of pressure.

“This is not just a simulacrum of conservatism – it is diabolical orthodoxy. It cannot be reformed or rethought. It has to be defeated,” he concluded.

Maksym Koliba: Ukrainian conservatism is alive and capable of change

Maksym Koliba, deputy dean of UCU, suggested looking at Ukrainian conservatism as selective, that is, one that can change slowly but consistently. He emphasized that Ukraine is not just the periphery of Europe, but its eastern part with a unique political and religious experience.

“We are neither West nor East. We are the eastern part of Western civilization,” Koliba said.

In his opinion, Ukraine has historically avoided the extremes of both Eastern Caesaropapism and Western centralization, and instead developed its own political culture with elements of elected leadership, responsibility, and freedom-lovingness. He cited the traditions of Rus’ and Cossack democracy, where leaders were elected but could also be overthrown if they betrayed trust.

“In Ukraine, Maidan is not an exception, but a mechanism. When something goes wrong, it starts up again,” he said.

Koliba also emphasized that religious tolerance is one of the key Ukrainian values, which is manifested both in political life and in interfaith dialogue. According to him, this feature should become a part of Ukraine’s external communication, especially in conversations with countries where religion still plays a large role in public life.

Yuriy Oliynyk: Russia is a mirror that distorts other people’s ideas

Political scientist and military officer Yuriy Oliynyk pointed out that the Russian model of full state control over the church is not really a legacy of Byzantium, but a Western borrowing. According to him, Peter the Great took as a model the synodal structures of Protestant countries, in particular Holland and England.

“This is not an ‘Orthodox tradition,’ as they present it, but a copy of Western practices, only brought to the point of absurdity,” Oliynyk said.

He characterized Russia as a “mirror” that borrows ideas from the West but transforms them to suit its own needs. The main goal of this transformation is not faith or ideology, but the preservation of the state machine and imperial expansion. That is why even religious narratives there are only an instrument of political play.

Oliynyk also warned against Ukraine’s own ideological extremes – the temptation to automatically reject any conservative thesis just because it is being promoted by Russia. He emphasized that many of Russia’s “traditional” messages are distorted versions of other people’s ideas, and that we should have a balanced discussion without being accused of “collusion with Moscow” for trying to talk about difficult things, such as abortion, faith, or morality in public space.

“Russia is broadcasting other people’s ideas through its distorted glass, so our task is not to copy, but to comprehend. And not to silence what is important just because the enemy is also talking about it,” he said.

Iryna Fenno: How Russia covers up its aggression with the “Orthodox” narrative

Iryna Fenno, Associate Professor of the Department of Religious Studies at the Kyiv National University, focused on exposing the use of Christian rhetoric in Russian propaganda. According to her, it is through a distorted interpretation of morality and faith that Russia is trying to legitimize the war, both on its own territory and abroad.

“Showing how Russia presents ‘Orthodoxy’ is a very effective tool,” the researcher emphasized.

Fenno spoke about the systematic work on documenting the destruction of religious buildings, which she is conducting together with religious scholar Ruslan Khalikov. It is about analyzing whether these attacks were intentional and how the occupiers turn religious sites into military targets.

Another topic of the speech was the ideologization of nuclear weapons. Iryna Fenno cited the example of public statements by Russian strategist Sergei Karaganov, who calls nuclear weapons a “gift from God” and its use a “moral duty of Russia.”

“It would be a sin not to use it,” is how Karaganov justifies a possible nuclear strike, supporting his theses with religious rhetoric. This is distortion of Christian ethicsand its exposure is an effective tool for countering it.”

Fenno also drew attention to the expansion of Russian propaganda. If earlier it was about “denazification of Ukraine,” now, according to data from the Russian World forums under the patronage of Patriarch Kirill, the focus is on “nazification of Europe.” In 2025, one of the forums was held under the slogan “Russian World Against Nazism,” which indicates an attempt to expand the zone of information warfare to a Western audience.

In this context, she emphasized the importance of properly conveying the Ukrainian message to the West. Especially to environments that value pacifism, interfaith respect, and the Christian understanding of non-violence. The task is to show how Russian ideology abuses these concepts and why true humanism is on the side of Ukraine.

Yuriy Zavgorodnyi: “Holy Rus,” Evil Genius, and the Challenges of the Technological Age

In his speech, philosopher and orientalist Yuriy Zavhorodnyi combined a historical analysis of religious identities with reflections on the nature of the Russian threat and new challenges for conservative thought in the twenty-first century.

Starting with the concepts of “Holy Rus” and “Kyiv as the Second Jerusalem,” the researcher noted that these ideas have deep roots in the Ukrainian tradition, but today they are on the periphery of discussions. Meanwhile, Russia is actively using the concept of “Holy Rus” as a propaganda tool. According to Zavhorodnyi, Ukraine is losing in this symbolic field, although it could rethink and actualize these concepts in its own way.

“These are very capacious, creative, and viable concepts. But now they are not in the spotlight, and this is a problem,” he said.

Zavhorodnyi focused on the nature of the Russian threat. He urged not to underestimate its complexity and scale, because Russia, he said, is not a temporary distortion, but a phenomenon that has been forming for more than half a thousand years. He characterized it metaphorically as an “evil genius” -strong, influential, but destructive.

“He is a genius, but he is evil, and this is the essence of the danger,” the expert explained.

In the context of new threats, Zavhorodnyi drew attention to the role of technology, which is changing the very essence of political and ideological divisions. According to him, modern traditionalism cannot ignore the challenges of nuclear weapons, digital control, or artificial intelligence.

“We may already be using dangerous tools without even fully realizing it,” he said.

The researcher supported the idea of creating working groups so that the discussion does not disappear without a trace but yields practical results. According to him, structured work on such topics should continue, in particular in an interdisciplinary format.

Structured work is the next step after the round table

The extended roundtable resulted in a decision to move from discussion to structured work. The participants agreed that the format of brainstorming, while productive for starting a discussion, was not sufficient for the practical implementation of ideas.

The goal of further work is to create applied tools for external communication: in particular, illustrative materials and indicators that will allow to clearly and reasonably refute the image of Russia as a “conservative” state, especially in communication with Western audiences.

Four areas of structured work

To summarize the discussion, four thematic areas within which the working groups could operate were outlined:

1. Ideological block:
Analysis of the state ideology of the Russian Federation, which does not reflect social realities and is created for export. It includes a study of the conflict and artificiality of the main ideological lines of Russian propaganda.

2. Social Indicators:
The use of statistics to demonstrate Russia’s inconsistency with declared “traditional” values. The focus is on data on divorce, murder, alcoholism, and violence.

3. Historical Perspective:
A study of the differences between Ukrainian and Russian political philosophy, with an emphasis on the interpretation of conservatism, religion, and national identity.

4. Religious Dimension:
A study of how Russia uses Christian rhetoric to justify aggression, including documentation of destroyed religious buildings and analysis of the ROC’s rhetoric.