Many Christian democratic parties in Europe were initially on the left, but after the economic recovery and the solution of workers’ material problems, they shifted from social extremes to centrism.

The Berlin organization, like most other CDU organizations, was dominated by left-wing sentiment. Among the Berlin bureau, the most influential were such authoritative left-wing figures as Andreas Hermes and Jakob Kaiser. The reputation of these two politicians was based on the fact that they did not betray their own views and did not compromise with the Nazi regime even in prison.

Both Hermes and the Kaiser were sincere supporters of “socialism based on Christian responsibility,” of Germany’s neutral status, which would become a “bridge” between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union. It was largely thanks to Hermes and the Kaiser that the concept of the “bridge” became popular in Germany at the time.

Given that Berlin was partially part of the Soviet occupation zone, the Soviet authorities could influence the processes in the Berlin bureau. Soviet declassified documents clearly state that the goal of the Soviet authorities was to influence the CDU in all zones of occupation by taking control of the Berlin Bureau. The Soviet occupation authorities could not think of a better option than pressure and repression.

Arrests, searches, intimidation-these were the methods used to put pressure on the Berlin Bureau. Due to the direct demands of the Soviet authorities, the CDU Berlin Bureau changed its leadership several times.

Despite the constant change of leadership and constant pressure on the Berlin CDU, it managed to establish high-quality work with party activists, the evangelical church, and Christian trade unions. The activity of the party’s Christian social welfare committees played a significant role.

In the 1946 state elections in the Soviet occupation zone, the Christian Democrats achieved quite good results despite great administrative pressure. The CDU began to become the second strongest party in East Germany.

The Berlin CDU secured the status of the most authoritative organization among the Christian unions in all zones of occupation. One way or another, the CDU managed to establish partnerships with the Soviet occupation administration. However, like any totalitarian regime, the Soviet government did not need partners. The USSR only needed satellites.

In late 1947 and early 1948, the pressure on the Berlin CDU reached its peak. More than 600 activists of the Christian Democratic Union were forced to leave the Soviet occupation zone. Among them were Andreas Hermes and Jakob Kaiser. In East Germany, although the CDU continued to exist, direct Soviet agents were put in charge of the organizations.

While the leadership of the Berlin CDU had previously been undisputed, in 1948 a leadership vacuum developed in the party. As a result, Konrad Adenauer, who had been uninfluential until then, gradually came to the forefront, pursuing a purely centrist domestic and maximally pro-Western foreign policy.

Later, in the first half of the 1950s, the USSR made enormous efforts to prevent the integration of the Adenauer-led Germany into Euro-Atlantic structures. But Adenauer’s unequivocal pro-Western stance put an end to these plans.

Paradoxically, but for the defeat of the Berlin CDU, left-wing circles would have remained dominant in the party. Most likely, a consensus of the CDU and the SPD would have developed in Germany, so the Kremlin would have easily achieved what it had been trying to achieve so unsuccessfully in the first half of the 1950s.

Centrism as a concept is still relevant for Christian democratic parties today. Although for a long time both left-wing parties, part of the press, and Soviet propaganda labeled Christian Democratic parties as “conservatives,” Christian Democrats themselves tried to avoid this term and continued to persistently position themselves as centrists.

There were two reasons for avoiding the term “conservative” in European continental political culture. First, the political memory was still alive with memories of conservative circles’ support for the rise to power of the Nazis and the Fascists. Secondly, the discourse of the second half of the twentieth century was largely based on the concepts of “progress,” “dynamics,” and “development.” Accordingly, any political force in continental Europe was unwilling to oppose this discourse, even at the semantic level.

Author: Konstantin Kanishev

In the past, two centuries ago, conservatism and liberalism were opposites in their views on democracy, and today conservatives are almost the only supporters of true democracy.

The right of the majority, freedom of speech, equality of all instead of privilege have traditionally been considered the fundamental principles of democracy. But in the twenty-first century, under the influence of the ideas of the New Left, liberalism began to move away from these principles in favor of what some see as “social justice.” Conservatism, on the other hand, has moved to the position of defending authentic democracy without racial and gender quotas, without punishment for freedom of expression, without “kenselling” and bullying of people of different views.

Conservatives are concerned not only about the decline in patriotism, but also about the general decline in the West’s authority on the planet, due to the prevailing system of ideological beliefs. Twenty years ago, Asians admired Western equality, respect for human rights, and Western democracy, and were shocked to learn that women in the West have the right to drive and choose whom they marry. A few decades ago, the West was bringing progress, justice, and destroying prejudice. Today, most of the top topics in the Western media cause misunderstanding and even ridicule among Indians, Arabs, or Africans. The Economist, an influential publication, notes a growing divergence between the liberal values of the West and the rest of the world. This situation can lead to marginalization instead of leadership.

Modern conservatism advocates the return of authentic democratic principles, according to which democracy should be a government of the majority, not a dictatorship of various minorities imposing their will on the majority. Conservatives are against calling minority views “progressivism” and majority views “populism” because it destroys the very foundations of democratic governance.

Conservatives see it as a problem that freedom of speech, as one of the greatest achievements of Western societies, is under threat because your statements or views “violate someone’s standards.” In fact, they may simply not be liked by some vulnerable and complex people.

Equality, as one of the greatest achievements of liberalism, is now turning into its opposite and advocating privileges for certain categories of the population. Conservatives today remain one of the few defenders of what they used to call democracy, equality, and true freedom without an asterisk and terabytes of fine print conditions that level the true meaning of democratic values.

Author: Valeriy Maydanyuk

The fact that Christian democratic parties emerged as part of resistance movements brought Christian democrats closer to socialists and communists. All of these parties were united by an appeal to social justice, a belief in the need for state intervention in the economy, and a rejection of liberal economic policies. It seemed that coalitions of former resistance forces-socialists, communists, and Christian democrats-would become dominant in Europe. If this scenario had been realized, it is likely that the history of the second half of the twentieth century would have been very different. Europe would most likely have become neutral, which would have significantly strengthened the position of the USSR in the Cold War.

Since 1947, geopolitical changes have taken place in the world that have significantly weakened the leftist influence in Christian democratic parties.

In the early postwar years, the Communists were considered one of the democratic parties in the West. They were seen as a reformist party that recognized elections and called for the establishment of democratic parliamentary republics in Europe. Both the victorious countries and European societies perceived the Communists as a full partner in the anti-fascist consensus.

It became a European norm that communists were part of coalition governments of the countries and individual states of occupied Germany. But the Kremlin’s unexpected turn and its demand that communist parties confront “bourgeois governments” significantly changed the European agenda. It is the policy of the Kremlin and the communists it controls that has contributed to the strengthening of centrist tendencies in Christian democratic parties.

As a result of the 1946 elections, a coalition was formed in France, which included the PCF, Christian Democrats, and Socialists. But in 1947, the Soviets demanded that the Communist Party, which they sponsored, leave the coalition and begin a confrontation with the “bourgeois government of France.” This change of political course came as a surprise to the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, and the French Communists themselves.

As a result of the confrontation between the Communists and other forces, other parties, including the Christian Democrats, made a significant shift to the right. Although the People’s Republican Movement later remained the most left-wing of all Christian democratic parties in Europe, the PRM unequivocally supported the creation of NATO, established cooperation with Germany, and rejected any possible alliance with the Communists as extremely unreliable partners.

Events in Italy followed a similarly confrontational scenario. During the war, both communist and Christian Democratic partisans, along with other parties, managed to establish cooperation and create the National Liberation Committee. This committee formed the postwar government of Italy.

In the postwar period, at the insistence of the USSR, Italian communists began to pursue a policy of fierce confrontation. Cooperation between other parties and the Communists seemed almost unrealistic. Accordingly, the left-wing circles in the Christian Democratic Party of Italy were weakened.

The results of the first postwar parliamentary elections in Italy were as follows: Christian Democrats – 48.51%, People’s Democratic Front (a bloc of the Italian Communist Party and the Italian Socialist Party) – 30.98%.

To this day, one can hear the opinion that the 1948 election results were won by the CDU due to American intervention and the influence of the Catholic Church. Neither the CDU’s alliance with the Vatican nor the American assistance can be denied, but the main reasons for the victory were completely different.

While the CDP emphasized the need to normalize and stabilize life in the country, the Communists emphasized the need for confrontation with the “bourgeois government.” This is what drove a significant number of voters away from the ICP.

The fact that the Communists were in favor of handing over Trieste, whose main population was Italian, to Communist Yugoslavia, also worked against them.

These factors were decisive in the election defeat of the Communists and the victory of the Christian Democrats.

Of course, there have always been conservative circles within European Christian democratic parties, but they have traditionally had little influence on the policies of their own parties.

A certain change in attitudes toward the word conservative occurred in the 1980s during the so-called “neoconservative revolution.” Neocons changed not only the economy but also discursive practices. The words “conservative,” “neocon,” and “liberal economics” became prestigious and symbolized success, strength, efficiency, and dynamism. Most Christian democratic parties began to position themselves as an association of centrist, conservative, and liberal politicians. However, positioning does not always equal practice. The ideology of Christian democratic parties continued to be based on the fusion of centrist and leftist ideas that had been laid down in the 1940s and 1950s.

Author: Konstantin Kanishev