A bastion of papier-mâché: the anatomy of russia’s fake conservatism

Ask any russian who supports the war why his country attacked Ukraine, and he will not be able to give you a clear answer. You may even hear about Freemasons, reptilians, Anunnaki and other representatives of earthly and extraterrestrial existence. The more down-to-earth ones will mumble something about the danger of NATO expansion, about Nazis and, of course, about defending traditional values. In his speech of 24 February 2022, putin said, among other things: “Until recently, attempts to use us in their own interests, to destroy our traditional values and to impose on us their pseudo-values, which would corrode us, our people, from within, have not stopped — the attitudes they are already aggressively imposing in their own countries and which lead directly to degradation and degeneration, because they contradict human nature itself. This will not happen; no one has ever succeeded in this. They will not succeed now.”

Many compare this speech with Hitler’s address to the Reichstag on 1 September 1939, and the regime that has taken shape in the russian federation with the Nazi regime of Hitler’s Germany. And indeed, the two speeches have a great deal in common. Replace “Danzig” with “Donbas” and “Poles” with “Ukrainians”, and you will not be able to tell one speech from the other. They are so similar that it becomes quite clear by whom, and by what, putin’s speechwriter was inspired. The markers are the same: assurances of peacefulness, casting the aggressor as the victim, appeals to history and so on. But in Hitler’s speech you will find nothing about defending so-called traditional values. And that is precisely what largely distinguishes the modern regime of the russian federation from Hitler’s Germany.

In its time, Nazi ideology was considered futuristic, dynamic and revolutionary — it was built on racial theory, biology and social Darwinism. Its creators rejected the old Christian morality as “weakness”. putin’s russia has invented its own, entirely unique construct: conservatism as a weapon of mass destruction. It is a purely russian ideological novelty of our time. The kremlin grasped a simple truth: in the 21st century you cannot sell the people of the “Western world” dead communism or marginalised fascism. But in the West there are millions of people (conservatives, religious communities, opponents of liberal progressivism) who feel lonely and lost in the modern world. russia created an “ideological offshore” for them.

This concept did not take shape overnight. Like any ideology, it went through stages of development, passed through the millstones of time, simmered for a long while in the heads of the so-called russian intelligentsia, and was eventually tailored to the needs of the regime.

putin came to power as an effective liberal leader, a champion of democratic values, an alternative to the communists, who were still popular in russia at the time. Over time, the effective liberal leader gradually but persistently turned into simply an “effective leader”; the prefix “liberal” disappeared. The image changed.

In an interview with the German channels ARD and ZDF on 5 May 2005, putin openly admired the Soviet past and called the collapse of the union a mistake, yet he also said: “As for how the Soviet Union built its policy towards its closest neighbours and allies, there is nothing surprising here. It built it in its own image and likeness, and that was a well-known system — a system that, unfortunately for our people, was not built on democratic principles. But such were the realities of the time, just as the colonial policy of quite a large number of European countries was a reality… It is absolutely impossible to return russia to former times. Nobody wants this or intends to do it… The transformations of the early 1990s did, after all, free the country from the monopoly power of one political force. In essence, this is the first step towards freedom, towards democracy. And of course, this gives us a chance to build relations as a normal civilised European nation with all our neighbours in Europe and the world. And the most important result of these changes is the change in the internal quality of russian society.”

Researchers note that the global turning point came during the Bolotnaya protests of 2012; others argue it came after the invasion of Georgia and the seizure of part of its territory in 2008. It is worth noting, however, that the formation of a conservative concept in russia began earlier. For example, in his address to the Federal Assembly of 10 May 2006, putin was already quoting Ivan Ilyin, the well-known russian philosopher and apologist of conservatism: “The well-known russian thinker Ivan Ilyin, reflecting on the basic principles on which the russian state must firmly stand, noted that a soldier is a high and honourable title, and that ‘he embodies all-russian national unity, the russian state will, strength and honour’.” Earlier, in October 2005, putin had Ilyin’s remains reburied in moscow at his own expense.

For context: Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin (1883–1954) was a russian philosopher, legal scholar and publicist. In 1922 the Bolsheviks expelled him, along with more than a hundred other intellectuals, on the so-called “philosophers’ ship”. In emigration, Ilyin became one of the chief ideologues of the White movement, but with a specific, radical bent. He sincerely believed that Western democracy was evil, weakness and a road to chaos, and that Bolshevism could only be defeated by an even more brutal, totalitarian force. In 1928 he published the article “On Fascism”, in which he openly praised Mussolini for having “stopped the left-wing threat”. For him, fascism was a “healthy manifestation” of the national spirit. In 1933, after the Nazis came to power, Ilyin wrote the article “National Socialism. A New Spirit”, in which he urged readers not to judge Hitler for the anti-Jewish pogroms but to understand his “great mission”. He wrote: “What did Hitler do? He stopped the process of Bolshevisation in Germany and thereby rendered the greatest service to all of Europe.” Later he fell out with the Gestapo over his independence and fled to Switzerland, but he did not renounce his ideas. After the Second World War, Ilyin wrote a collection of articles with instructions for a future russia after the fall of communism. His recipe was simple: no democratic elections; russia needs a sole leader, a harsh dictatorship, total state control over society and a cult of the army.

It was with a quotation from Ilyin that putin ended his notorious speech of 30 September 2022 on the annexation of Ukrainian territories: “And I want to end my speech with the words of a true patriot, Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin: ‘If I consider russia my Motherland, that means that I love, contemplate and think in russian, sing and speak in russian; that I believe in the spiritual strength of the russian people. Its spirit is my spirit; its fate is my fate; its suffering is my grief; its flourishing is my joy.'”

In other words, putin carried this love, this childlike fascination with russian chauvinism, from the start of his tenure in the 2000s all the way into the 2020s. And while the press showed the picture of an effective liberal leader and petrodollars flowed into the russian budget, putin was reading Ilyin and admiring, for example, theses like these: “Ukrainian separatism is an artificial phenomenon, devoid of real foundations. It arose from the ambition of its leaders and international intrigues of conquest. By separating, this state dooms itself to conquest and plunder by foreigners. Little russia and Great russia are bound together by faith, tribe, historical destiny, geographical position, economy, culture and politics. Foreigners preparing the dismemberment must remember that by doing so they declare a centuries-long struggle against all of russia. There will be no peace and no economic prosperity in the east with such a dismemberment. russia will become a source of civil and international wars for centuries.”

Nevertheless, the global turning point did come after 2012 — not in the mind of putin or the russian political elites, since, as we have seen, the direction had already been chosen by then, but rather in the pace at which that direction was implemented and in some of its details. When, in the winter of 2011–2012, crowds of a hundred thousand educated middle-class people came out to Bolotnaya Square and Sakharov Avenue in moscow with slogans for fair elections, a tectonic shift took place in the kremlin. putin saw a mortal threat in these well-fed, Europeanised city dwellers with new iPhones. The progressive, liberal path of development that had been imitated in the 2000s suddenly turned out to be dangerous for the very survival of the regime. The big cities were to be countered by the so-called “deep russia” — the conservative, patriarchal, religious provinces, the working class of the defence plants and, of course, the obedient apparatus of the rpc.

It was at this moment that the “traditional values” brand became the main weapon of the domestic war. In his speeches after returning to the presidency in 2012, putin began openly and aggressively attacking the West. He no longer mentioned European and democratic values. The kremlin branded the West as “barren and genderless”, having abandoned its Christian roots, and proclaimed russia the only messianic saviour of human morality.

At the same time the so-called Izborsk Club was created — the apotheosis of the fusion of all the conservative radicals, from Dugin and Prokhanov to the chauvinist economist Glazyev. The club was set up right after Bolotnaya Square under the patronage of the kremlin. It was an official order from the authorities to construct an “anti-Western ideology”. In 2013 this turn received its first legislative flesh: the law banning “gay propaganda” was passed.

Thus was born that very “ideological offshore”. russian conservatism finally turned into a franchise. The kremlin began deliberately investing millions in funding Europe’s far-right parties, religious congresses and conservative bloggers. The Western man in the street was sold an attractive wrapper: russia as the “last bastion” of faith, the strong family and the traditional order.

The truth, however, is that this “bastion” is built of papier-mâché.

A bastion of papier-mâché

First, let us establish what these traditional values actually are. On 9 November 2022, putin signed Decree No. 809 “On Approving the Foundations of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional russian Spiritual and Moral Values”. This is essentially the first document in which the kremlin tried to codify its concept legally, without the usual pathos and whataboutism. Points 4 and 5 of the decree state: “Traditional values are moral guidelines that shape the worldview of russian citizens, are passed down from generation to generation, underlie the all-russian civic identity and the single cultural space of the country, strengthen civic unity, and have found their unique, distinctive expression in the spiritual, historical and cultural development of the multinational people of russia. Traditional values include: life, dignity, human rights and freedoms, patriotism, citizenship, service to the Fatherland and responsibility for its fate, high moral ideals, a strong family, creative work, the priority of the spiritual over the material, humanism, mercy, justice, collectivism, mutual assistance and mutual respect, historical memory and the continuity of generations, and the unity of the peoples of russia.”

It sounds wonderful. Life, humanism — which, incidentally, is the foundation of modern liberal Western society — justice, mercy: practically Eden on earth. But the truth is that the law on “mercy”, “humanism” and “justice” was signed by the same hand that signed, for example, the order to seize territory from a neighbouring state. And it is not even about territory; it is about the fact that, for scraps of land, a man who proclaims humanism and life as his traditional values has sent more than a million fellow citizens into the “meat grinder”. As the saying goes, every life is precious, but some are more precious than others.

We will not even talk about the other values of the russian federation. The statistics will say it better than we can.

• First of all, the family. In 2024 russia registered 880,000 marriages and 644,500 divorces. That is, the ratio of divorces to marriages was 73.2% (in other words, for every 10 new families, more than 7 break up). Interestingly, in 2020 the situation was identical: 770,800 marriages and 564,000 divorces — the same 73.2%. This must be the “stability” putin is so fond of talking about.

For comparison: in Ukraine in 2024, 150,200 marriages and 34,200 divorces were registered — a divorce-to-marriage ratio of 22.8%. In the US over the same period there were almost 1 million divorces for roughly 2.4 million marriages (41.2%), and in the EU countries 700,000 for roughly 1.7 million (41.1%).

• It is quite difficult to establish the number of offences in domestic relations in russia, because in 2017 the “humanist” putin signed with his own hand a bill moving domestic violence from criminal to administrative law. However, according to russia’s official report to the UN, 963 women died from domestic violence in 2024 — half of all intentional killings of women. At the same time, according to Forbes, the “All-russian Helpline for Women” received almost 24,000 calls in 2025; the organisation reports that in 70% of cases women endure violence regularly, and one in five has been a victim for more than 10 years. In this context, a quote from the chair of the State Duma committee on family protection is telling — she said that criminalising domestic violence could destroy the so-called institution of the family: “We need to think about how this will affect the institution of the family — whether it will strengthen the institution of the family, whether it will really become the norm that once and for all blocks the path of domestic violence, or whether it will further affect the fact that our institution of the family is already in ruins, 8 out of 10 divorces, and that this will be another blow to the institution of the family.”

No comment is needed here.

• As of 1 January 2025, russia had 340,055 orphaned children (1.14% of all children). Most of them are social orphans — children left by their parents voluntarily or removed by court decision. For example, in 2024, 39,583 orphaned children were registered, of whom 26,594 were social orphans (67.2%). According to russian children’s ombudsmen, social orphans make up 70–80% of the total (roughly 270,000–290,000). Although russia treats such figures as an undoubted success and declares a decrease compared with previous years, the numbers remain grim: there are about 10 social orphans per thousand children in russia. This is one of the highest rates among developed countries.
• About 30% of all families with minor children in russia are single-parent families. As of 2023, russia had more than 15.5 million families, of which 5 million were single-parent.
• According to the russian Interior Ministry, during Easter 2023, one of the greatest Christian holidays, 2.8 million people attended churches in russia — about 1.9% of the population. By comparison, 21% of churchgoers in the US attend weekly; in Ukraine 12% of Orthodox and 43% of Catholics; in Poland 41%.
• As of 2024, more than 1.7 million cases of HIV had been recorded in russia; over 1% of the adult population is HIV-positive (about 1,250,000 people). This is the highest rate in Europe.
• According to official data, the number of citizens who regularly use drugs in russia is about 1.2–1.3 million — and this is only the recorded monitoring minimum. Independent medical estimates and expert reports, including those voiced in the relevant committees, suggest that the real number of people familiar with drugs is between 5 and 6 million. As a percentage of the population, this is overall one of the lowest figures in Europe. But the devil is in the details: every year around 8,000 people officially die in russia from causes directly related to drug use (overdoses, related illnesses) — about 50 people per million. That is higher than the European average. In Ukraine, by various estimates, 1,000 to 2,000 die (30–50 per million); in France 900 (15 per million); in Germany 2,500 (30 per million).
• At the end of 2024, 908,100 people in russia were under outpatient supervision with a diagnosis of alcoholism or alcoholic psychosis — 671 per 100,000 population, according to an analysis of official statistics of the russian health ministry. In 2025 the number of russians diagnosed with alcoholism or alcoholic psychosis for the first time reached 56.9 per 100,000 — up about 30% on 2024, the largest annual increase on record. Experts note that official statistics significantly underestimate the real number of people with alcohol dependence, because people avoid registering with addiction services, self-medicate, use private clinics or do not seek help at all. By various estimates, 5–7% of russia’s adult population (about 7 million people) has an alcohol use disorder — higher than in the US (6.3%) and above the European average.
• According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), more than 10,200 intentional homicides were recorded in russia in 2021 (about 7 per 100,000). This is higher than in the US (6 per 100,000) and Ukraine (4 per 100,000), and several times higher than the European average.

So let us sum up. There is not much to say: the figures speak for themselves. And we have not even cited the statistics on suicide, the corruption index and so on, where the russian Eden confidently holds leading positions, second only to African dictatorships.

You know, russia is like that troubled neighbour in the flat across the landing. He beats his wife, drinks and abuses drugs, and when you call the police, they merely express concern. And gradually you get used to this neighbour. You live your life, closing your eyes to the screams from across the hall, quietly hoping only that he won’t pick on you. But he does. Sometimes even with apparently good intentions: smiling sweetly, unshaven, unwashed and unkempt, he offers you a bottle. Sometimes he even shows a desire to improve. He stops drinking and beating his wife, and starts going to work. And you are glad for him, truly glad, because it also guarantees you some peace. You agree with the other neighbours, suggest he see an addiction specialist or a psychologist, sort out his family life. And he seems willing… But it doesn’t last. A month, two, six months pass, and he returns to his default settings. Again screams come from the flat next door. And for your suggestions you risk getting punched in the face, because, he says, he will decide for himself how to live.

So what is this conservatism that so appealed to some Western elites? The right to beat your wife with impunity while hiding behind quotes from Ilyin, empty golden church domes on Easter night, alcoholism, orphanhood and AIDS. Unlike borders, sociological statistics cannot be moved by tanks.

Sources

• Pavliuk A. How many marriages and divorces were registered in Ukraine in 2024? Ministry of Justice statistics // Ukrainska Pravda. https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/skilki-shlyubiv-i-rozluchen-zareyestruvali-v-ukrajini-u-2024-roci-min-yust-306197/ (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Yakubova L. Ivan Ilyin. Patriarch of russian fascism // Ukrainskyi Tyzhden. 2022. https://tyzhden.ua/ivan-ilin-patriarkh-rosijskoho-fashyzmu/ (accessed 19.07.2026).
• Academician Pokrovsky: every hundredth russian is infected with HIV // TASS. 2025. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/25778065 (accessed 20.07.2026).
• The State Duma called the law banning domestic violence a blow to the family // The Moscow Times (russian service). 2026. https://ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/07/09/v-gosdume-nazvali-udarom-po-seme-zakon-o-zaprete-domashnego-nasiliya-a200447 (accessed 20.07.2026).
• The number of people with alcohol dependence has begun to grow in russia // Kommersant. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8796023 (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Data on church attendance at Easter 2023 // SOVA Center. 2023. https://www.sova-center.ru/religion/news/how-many/2023/04/d47984/ (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Ilyin I. A. National Socialism. A New Spirit (1933) // RoyalLib. https://royallib.com/book/ilin_ivan/natsionalsotsializm_1_noviy_duh.html (accessed 19.07.2026).
• Ilyin I. A. Foundations of the Struggle for a National russia. Belgrade: NTS, 1938. 66 pp.
• Interview with the German TV channels ARD and ZDF, 5 May 2005. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22948 (accessed 19.07.2026).
• Kolesnikov A. Agony after death: the Izborsk Club has begun working on a new russian idea // Novaya Gazeta. 2013. https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2013/01/11/53055-agoniya-posle-smerti (accessed 19.07.2026).
• Mamikonyan O. Domestic violence on the rise in russia // Forbes Life russia. https://www.forbes.ru/forbeslife/559762-v-rossii-zafiksirovali-rost-domasnego-nasilia (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Model regional action plan (“road map”) on developing family support and preventing social orphanhood, 2026–2030 // Garant. https://base.garant.ru/414305462/ (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Address by the President of the russian federation, 24 February 2022. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 (accessed 19.07.2026).
• Osmolovskaya K. Almost 1,000 women died from domestic violence in russia in 2024 // Vazhnye Istorii (iStories). 2025. https://istories.media/news/2025/10/31/v-2024-godu-ot-domashnego-nasiliya-v-rossii-pogibli-pochti-1000-zhenshchin/ (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Official monitoring of the number of drug-dependent citizens in the russian federation // Main Directorate for Drug Control of the russian Interior Ministry / Gubnews. https://www.gubnews.ru/news_mvd.php?id=41555 (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Address to the Federal Assembly, 10 May 2006. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23577 (accessed 19.07.2026).
• Signing of treaties on the accession of the “DPR”, “LPR”, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, 30 September 2022. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/145 (accessed 19.07.2026).
• How many single mothers there are in russia // Banki.ru. 2024. https://www.banki.ru/news/lenta/?id=11001673 (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Social consequences of alcoholism // Trezvyi Mir. 2025. https://trezvyi-mir.ru/pacientam/articles/sotsialnye_posledstviya_alkogolizma/ (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Divorce statistics in russia in 2025 // T—Zh. https://t-j.ru/stat-divorce/ (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Uzhvak P., Nikolaeva R. Incidence of alcoholism and alcoholic psychosis among russians up by a third // Vazhnye Istorii (iStories). 2026. https://istories.media/news/2026/04/16/zabolevaemost-rossiyan-alkogolizmom-i-alkogolnim-psikhozom-virosla-na-tret/ (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Decree of the President of the russian federation No. 809 of 09.11.2022. http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/48502 (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Eurostat: Since 1964, marriage rate in EU has more than halved, divorce rate has doubled // The Sofia Globe. 2026. https://sofiaglobe.com/2026/03/22/eurostat-since-1964-marriage-rate-in-eu-has-more-than-halved-divorce-rate-has-doubled/ (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Gina C. Gallup: Just 3 in 10 US adults regularly attend religious services // OSV News. 2024. https://www.osvnews.com/gallup-just-3-in-10-us-adults-regularly-attend-religious-services/ (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) // The World Bank Data (UNODC). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5 (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Krista K. Marriage-Divorce Ratio in the U.S.: Geographic Variation, 2024 // NCFMR, BGSU. https://www.bgsu.edu/ncfmr/resources/data/family-profiles/fp-25-32.html (accessed 20.07.2026).
• Religious belief and national belonging in central and eastern Europe // Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/05/10/religious-commitment-and-practices/ (accessed 20.07.2026).

Author: Vitalii Chornoboi